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Abstract: 
 
This paper explores the changing role of government involvement in health care 
financing policy outside the United States. It provides a review of the economics 
literature in this area to understand the implications of recent policy changes on 
efficiency, costs and quality.  Our review reveals that there has been some convergence 
in policies adopted across countries to improve financing incentives and encourage 
efficient use of health services. In the case of risk pooling, all countries with competing 
pools experience similar difficulties with selection and are adopting more sophisticated 
forms of risk adjustment. In the case of hospital competition, the key drivers of success 
appear to be what is competed on and measurable rather than whether the system is 
public or private. In the case of both the success of performance-related pay for 
providers and issues resulting from wait times, evidence differs both within and across 
jurisdictions. However, the evidence does suggest that some governments have 
effectively reduced wait times when they have chosen explicitly to focus on achieving 
this goal. Many countries are exploring new ways of generating revenues for health 
care to enable them to cope with significant cost growth. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that collection mechanisms alone are effective in managing the cost 
or quality of care.   
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I. Introduction 
  
 A large part of the recent debate over health care reform in the United States 
focused on how much government involvement is appropriate in the health care sector. 
Nations across the OECD ensure universal access to health care for their citizens 
through national or regional risk pooling financed by mandatory income-related 
contributions (premiums). Ensuring universal protection against the costs of health care 
and controlling public expenditures requires a significant degree of national or regional 
management -- a common feature across these countries. Yet no two health systems are 
identical and OECD countries achieve this goal in a variety of different ways. Many 
health systems make substantial use of market mechanisms, for example, despite 
having extensive public funding and regulation.  
This paper explores the changing role of government involvement in health care 
financing policy outside the United States. It provides a review of the economics 
literature in this area to understand the implications of recent policy changes on 
efficiency, costs and quality. Economists and health policy researchers have written 
extensively on the differences in health care costs and coverage rates across countries. 
In these two areas – share of GDP (gross domestic product) spent on health and share 
of people without any form of health coverage – the US has long been an outlier. 
However, while there are many similarities across ‘the rest’ of the countries in the 
OECD there are also substantial differences in policy design. In addition, significant 
policy changes in the last ten years have in some cases led to a degree of convergence 
with the US. Examples include the introduction of a universal mandate in the United 
States, the move towards a competitive health insurance market in Germany and the 
Netherlands, and the adoption of market-like mechanisms such as activity-based 
funding to pay hospitals, selective contracting, and provider competition. 
To better understand how OECD health systems both differ from and have 
converged towards the health system in the United States over the past decade, and to 
organize the vast literature on financing health care, we specify three financing 
functions present in any health system, whether made explicit or not: raising revenue 
for the health system (collection); pooling risk; and purchasing services (Kutzin, 2001). 
A fourth dimension – making coverage decisions (whom, what and how much to cover) 
– cuts across the three functions, as shown in Figure 1. We use this framework to 
explore the economic literature on the relationship between the financing functions and 
health system performance, drawing on recent work from the United States when 
appropriate.  
 There are other useful ways of characterizing health systems. For example, 
Reinhardt’s taxonomy of the components of health systems distinguishes between 
government, not-for-profit and for-profit on the production side and social insurance, 
private insurance and no insurance on the financing side (Reinhardt, 2009). We use 
Kutzin’s framework for the following reasons. First, it allows for a comparison of any 
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type of health system, and avoids the use of traditional labels (e.g. ‘tax financed’ or 
‘social insurance’). This has the advantage of revealing rather than obscuring vital 
similarities and differences between systems in the way that many classifications do. 
Second, it enables us to get away from terms such as ‘private’ or ‘public’, shifting the 
emphasis onto differences in how countries carry out the functions as opposed to 
differences in the legal status of the agents responsible for collection, pooling and 
purchasing. Third, it allows us to focus the review on functions rather than on tools and 
goals. While many countries include equity, for example, among the goals of the 
system, this goal is affected, under each function, by the nature of the tools in use. 
Similarly, taxes and regulation are widely used tools rather than functions of the health 
care financing system. Fourth, the framework highlights how health financing functions 
are more or less independent of each other; decisions about how to pool risks and 
purchase services can be made irrespective of how revenues are raised.  
The research goals for this paper, then, are to explore the economic implications 
of the different ways in which OECD health systems carry out the financing functions, 
how policy changes have resulted in more market forces within these jurisdictions, and 
the effects of these changes on system efficiency, costs, and outcomes (quality). We do 
not review or evaluate the literature examining the justification for government 
intervention in the health sector because the government plays a major role in financing 
health care in all OECD countries, including the United States. Also, while we analyze 
the efficiency and effectiveness of a number of policy interventions on particular 
populations, we are often unable to make claims about the overall welfare implications 
of government intervention in the countries we examine.  
Our review reveals that there has been some convergence in policies adopted 
across countries to improve financing incentives and encourage efficient use of health 
services. In the case of risk pooling, all countries with competing pools experience 
similar difficulties with selection and are adopting more sophisticated forms of risk 
adjustment. In the case of hospital competition, the key drivers of success appear to be 
what is competed on and measurable rather than whether the system is public or 
private. In the case of both the success of performance-related pay for providers and 
issues resulting from wait times, evidence differs both within and across jurisdictions. 
However, the evidence does suggest that some governments have effectively reduced 
wait times when they have chosen explicitly to focus on achieving this goal.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we begin with a brief overview of 
the countries we consider in this review. We then explore the economics literature 
outside the United States for each of the financing functions listed above, examining 
the consequences of public policy choices made around financing health care. We 
review the theoretical literature where it guides differences between the United States 
and other jurisdictions, although our focus is on the empirical economic analysis of 
health care financing policy choices internationally. We then summarize the 
implications of the evidence and offer some general conclusions. 
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2. Background information on selected countries 
 
Although we have no strict criteria for a country’s inclusion in our review, we 
restrict our focus to recent literature on health care financing published in  economic 
journals in English. As a result, a large amount of the work reviewed here focuses on a 
small number of countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom.  
Figure 2 compares the financing mix in these countries and in the United States 
in 2011 or the most recent year for which data are available. It shows how all seven 
countries use the full range of financing mechanisms. Public finance (general and 
earmarked taxes) dominates and its share has grown slightly over time in all except 
Germany. The UK relies most heavily on general taxes followed by Canada and 
Australia, although the extent of the difference between the countries is partly an 
artifact arising from the way in which the data are presented. Statutory health insurance 
(SHI) funds (funds that are compulsory and enforced by law) in most European 
countries obtain some of their revenue from other tax sources in addition to payroll 
taxes. Internationally, health financing data are broken down by expenditure agent 
rather than by collection mechanism. This has the effect of obscuring the true ‘source’ 
of public revenues for the health sector. In countries in which purchasers are statutory 
health insurance funds, some non-payroll tax revenue is invisible in international 
statistics, even when it may be substantial; in France it accounts for over a third of SHI 
revenue (Chevreul et al. 2010). The corollary is that payroll tax revenue may not visible 
in countries where central government agencies pool funds and purchase health 
services; in the UK it accounted for almost 20% of National Health Service (NHS) 
revenue in 2007, the latest year for which this figure is available (Boyle 2011). 
OECD data indicate that six out of the seven countries enjoy universal coverage 
(Table 1a).  The basis for entitlement to statutory coverage varies across the countries 
and has changed over time within countries. Entitlement is based on residence in 
England, Canada, Australia, and France, while Germany and Switzerland employ 
universal mandates. Universally compulsory coverage is a relatively recent 
development in France, Germany and Switzerland. Switzerland introduced compulsory 
universal coverage in 1996 to address concerns about unequal access to health 
insurance, gaps in coverage and rising health expenditure (Crivelli 2013 in press). 
Before 2000 statutory health insurance in France was compulsory for workers and their 
dependants and voluntary for everyone else; those who could not afford to pay the 
fixed (non-income-related) contribution for voluntary coverage relied on locally 
administered government subsidies (Chevreul et al. 2010). In 2000 France broke the 
link with employment and extended income-related contributions to all residents, with 
free access to health insurance for those with very low incomes. In 2009 Germany 
introduced compulsory universal coverage to stem the growing number of uninsured 
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people (van Ginneken and Busse 2009), but it maintained the link between statutory 
coverage and employment. 
Germany is the only OECD country to allow higher earners to opt out of 
contributing to the statutory health insurance scheme and be privately covered instead. 
Voluntary (private) health insurance plays a range of roles across the seven countries, 
as shown in Table 1a. With the exception of the US, however, its contribution to total 
spending on health does not exceed 15%. Measured in terms of contribution to total 
spending on health, France, Germany and Switzerland have three of the four largest 
markets for voluntary health insurance in Europe (Thomson and Mossialos 2009). 
Collection agents for the dominant public financing mechanism range from 
national tax agencies in England, Canada, and Australia and the national social security 
agency in France, to individual health insurance funds in Germany and Switzerland. 
Almost uniquely in Europe, Swiss health insurance funds are free to set their own 
contribution rates (Thomson et al. 2009) (Table 1b). In contrast, contribution rates in 
France and Germany are determined by central government, long the norm in France 
but a recent development in Germany (introduced in 2009) (Ognyanova and Busse 
2009). Switzerland is unique in two other ways. First, it uses community-rated rather 
than income-related contributions to finance statutory coverage, and these can vary 
significantly across funds, even in the same Canton (region). Second, it requires all 
citizens, including dependent adults and children, to pay premiums, whereas in France 
and Germany statutory health insurance automatically covers dependents at no extra 
cost to the household. France also exempts adults with annual taxable incomes below 
!9,020 from paying contributions (about 2.3% of the population in 2006) (Chevreul et 
al. 2010). 
To secure financial protection for low-income households the Swiss Cantons 
operate a system of premium subsidies within parameters defined by the federal 
government but with leeway to set eligibility thresholds for subsidies and to determine 
the magnitude of subsidies. Until recently, the federal government used a system of 
matching grants to encourage Cantons to offer a minimum level of subsidy. In spite of 
this, there can be large differences across Cantons in eligibility for subsidies and 
household premium costs (Thomson et al., 2013). The other countries avoid the need 
for administratively complex and potentially inequitable subsidies by imposing a 
national contribution rate and linking contributions to income. 
As in the US, people in Germany and Switzerland have choice of health insurer 
for publicly financed benefits (Table 1b). Insurers compete for enrollees and are subject 
to some form of risk adjustment mechanism, to lower their incentive to select risks. 
In terms of health care delivery, patients in all of the countries can generally 
choose their physician and hospital. Gatekeeping (the requirement for a referral for 
access to specialist care) is widely encouraged, often through financial incentives. All 
seven countries have experimented with different ways of paying providers. Fee-for-
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service payment of physicians continues to dominate in all except England, while 
activity-based funding through diagnosis-related groups (a system which classifies 
hospital cases/procedures into groups and then assigns payment prices for these groups, 
commonly referred to as DRGs) is rapidly becoming the norm for paying hospitals. 
Efforts to link provider payment to performance feature in all except Canada and 
Switzerland. 
 
3. Generating and Collecting Revenue  
 
 How systems transfer money from individuals to providers has implications for 
the efficiency of both the health system and the economy through employment effects 
and dead weight loss. It also affects financial protection for individuals against loss and 
the pooling of risk and may also affect the rate of growth of health care costs and the 
responsiveness of the health system to changes in economic activity. Publicly financed 
health care is usually generated via two collection mechanisms - general taxes and 
earmarked taxes (often referred to as social insurance contributions, particularly when 
levied on wages) – and often supplemented by user fees. General taxes and social 
insurance contributions affect the medical sector directly only because of political 
economy considerations, while user fees will have direct effects on the medical sector. 
This section first considers the relative efficiency of general taxes versus earmarked 
taxes then looks at user fees. The major empirical findings are highlighted in Table 2. 
 
General and Earmarked Taxes 
The relative efficiency of different types of taxes used to finance health systems 
has been explored in the public finance and health economics literature. The equity and 
efficiency properties of general taxation (c.f. Auerbach, 1985) do not differ depending 
on whether the money is spent on health or education per se, although if the level of 
government that collects revenue differs from the level of government that provides 
health coverage there may be equity issues and issues about whether the level of 
taxation best meets local demand for the services required (c.f. Ahmad and Brosio, 
2006). Of course, the amount of deadweight loss associated with any revenue 
generation will depend on the balance and type of taxes used to raise the revenue. Once 
again, standard public finance theory on the relative deadweight loss of income versus 
payroll versus consumption taxes apply, regardless of the good being purchased with 
the revenue (Sandmo, 1976).  
 Economic theory on the relative efficiency of social insurance contributions 
versus general taxes suggests that where the contributions are applied to an entire 
population or group, without option, and without direct linkage to the benefit received, 
the contribution is equivalent to a tax (Blomqvist, 2011). If the contribution program is 
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directly related to the benefit program, then only the difference between the 
contribution required and the value of the benefit received will be treated as a tax. 
Although the public finance literature outlines the inefficiencies inherent in earmarked 
funding, if contributions are earmarked for health care there may be political economy 
reasons (such transparency and greater protection from political interference) why 
voters prefer them to taxes (Mossialos and Dixon, 2002). 
Some systems mandate individuals to obtain coverage through a network of 
insurers and may allow insurers to collect some or all of the revenue. In such cases part 
or all of the contribution may be levied in the form of a community-rated premium 
rather than as a proportion of income. There may be a single risk pool or multiple risk 
pools with or without public subsidy (we turn to this issue in more detail later). 
Whether government collection of revenues is superior or inferior to other mechanisms 
for ensuring financial security such as mandating coverage depends on a number of 
factors (explored in Summers, 1989). First, mandates and taxes on labor can affect the 
level of employment and wages. The extent depends on the supply of and demand for 
labor and consequent deadweight loss. Mandates, if they are implemented as benefits 
per worker, will operate similar to a lump sum tax. If certain types of employment are 
exempt (such as part-time work) mandates may have large effects on the demand for 
full-time versus part-time work. Second, health coverage leads to an income effect, the 
size of which depends on the individual’s valuation of the health coverage. Third, the 
governance of public insurance is subject to the usual political economy problems of 
government. 
Gruber (2000) provides a simple formalization of this analysis that is useful for 
understanding the employment effects. Suppose labor demand, Ld, is given by: 
 
Ld=fd(W+C)  
 
where W is wages and C is insurance cost; and labor supply given by: 
 
Ls=fs(W+!C)  
 
where !C is the monetary value that employees place on health insurance. In this case ! 
is the valuation of the marginal dollar of health insurance. Then it is the case that: 
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!C =
"!d ""! s
!d "! s
 
 
where !d  and ! s  are the elasticities of demand and supply for labor. Gruber notes that 
this equation differs from the standard incidence of a tax on labor by the term !" s  
which “captures the increase in labor supply due to employee valuation of more 
expensive insurance” (Gruber, 2000, p. 660). 
Valuations of !<1 may be more likely under publicly provided coverage or 
mandates as contributions to the system are typically disconnected from benefits 
received. This disconnect occurs whenever redistribution is an important element of the 
public insurance arrangement and is minimized if benefits are valued at their full cost. 
Where insurance is provided even if individuals do not work, then the valuation of the 
benefit (!) will be closer to 0 than if benefits are only available to workers (depending 
on any difference in coverage between workers and non-workers) and the cost will 
have a larger negative effect on employment. 
Given that mandated insurance can be less redistributive than publicly provided 
coverage, does not necessarily involve centralized revenue collection, and does not 
generally involve government provision of insurance or services, it is arguable that 
these inefficiencies are smaller for mandates than for publicly provided insurance. 
Summers (1989) therefore concludes that mandates are to be preferred to public 
provision. On the other hand, transaction costs and the effectiveness of mandates may 
be a matter of concern. A variety of other economic and political factors, including a 
desire to redistribute through the health insurance system, may cause systems to deviate 
from the theoretically superior outcome. 
Many health systems explicitly or implicitly aim to redistribute income from 
higher- to lower-income individuals. The extent of this redistribution is a not a priori 
related to the financing mechanism used, although health systems financed through 
general tax revenues tend to be more redistributive in practice than those financed 
through social insurance contributions and those that are more privately financed 
(Wagstaff et al, 1992; Wagstaff, 2010). Payroll contributions are often capped, unlike 
income taxes, and if they are progressive instead of proportional, they tend to have 
smaller increases in the marginal rate as they move up the income scale. Another 
important element of the extent of redistribution will be the utilization of the system by 
high- versus low-income individuals. Once differences in access and life expectancy 
are taken into account, it may be the case that the marginal dollar allocated to health 
care is less redistributive than a dollar allocated to education or income assistance 
because higher income individuals are likely to live longer and therefore benefit more 
from the publicly financed health care system (Glied, 2008).  
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There is a long-standing debate in the literature on whether health systems 
financed through general tax revenues are better able to control health care costs than 
those financed through social insurance contributions, and on the relationship between 
financing structure and health outcomes. One of the difficulties with the literature is 
that characterizing a health system by its primary source of finance is akin to painting 
with an extremely large brush. No two tax-financed or social insurance-financed 
systems are alike; for example, the UK and Canada are both tax financed, but there are 
few other similarities. In one recent study, Wagstaff (2009) uses system changes from 
general tax financing to social insurance within OECD countries between 1960 and 
2006 to examine whether social health insurance leads to increased or decreased cost 
growth. Looking at changes within countries over time potentially overcomes the 
problems of comparisons across very different systems. However, large changes in 
financing are somewhat rare, and may be a function of other underlying economic 
conditions also related to public spending. To try and account for the fact that switching 
is potentially endogenous, these models include both difference-in-difference models 
and IV models (using lags of the social insurance indicator variable as an instrument). 
The findings suggest that there is an increase in health care costs of 3 to 4 percent 
associated with a move to social insurance and that this move is related to a decline in 
formal sector employment of 8 to 10 percent. Some of the decline in formal sector 
employment may simply involve a shift to non-formal employment (presumably to 
avoid the costs associated with social insurance premiums in formal employment 
settings) as the estimates on overall employment levels are smaller and less robust. The 
study finds no evidence that the transition to social insurance results in declines in 
avoidable mortality (deaths from specific conditions, such as diabetes, which should 
not occur if timely and effective care is available). The results are driven by those 
countries which transitioned from social insurance to tax financed or vice versa, 
including Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Spain who moved away from social insurance, 
and a number of eastern European countries who moved toward it.  
 A related paper (Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra, 2009) uses a similar methodology 
to look at a different set of countries and time period. They examine transitions 
between one financing structure and another among Eastern European and Asian 
countries between 1990 and 2003. These transitions were relatively large and fast 
compared to the slower evolution of more developed health care systems. They find 
even larger results for the transition from general tax-financed to social insurance 
financing. Their estimates of increases in spending per capita are in the order of 11 
percent, with a 3 percent increase in inpatient admissions (although average length of 
stay declined). Once again, there was no evidence of differences in health outcomes as 
a result of financing transitions. Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra suggest that physicians in 
these countries saw the transition as an opportunity to increase resources in the system 
and therefore their incomes which may help explain some of the results. They also 
hypothesize that the transition to social insurance lead to less integrated systems 
leaving some people slow to sign up for insurance and others not captured by 
prevention programs, both potentially leading to increased overall costs. However, the 
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fact that they find no overall change in outcomes suggests that the magnitude of these 
types of effects must have been fairly small.  
 A recent paper by Cylus et al. (2012) explores the relationship between 
collection mechanism (tax-financed versus social insurance) and the relationship 
between economic downturns and health care spending. Using OECD data on within 
country variations for several European countries, the authors estimate models of the 
relationship between changes in GDP and changes in public health care expenditures. 
They find that growth in public health care expenditures is more strongly associated 
with changes in GDP (positively) in tax-financed countries than in countries primarily 
funded through social insurance contributions. The results stem from cost shifting and 
other policy changes in tax financed-countries that occurred in economic downturns. 
While policy responses to economic crises are clearly possible in social insurance 
countries as well, cost shifting (mainly onto users) did not occur to the same extent. 
The authors hypothesize that tax-financed countries are, in general, more susceptible to 
government decisions to reduce costs in times of economic crisis.  
Finally, recent work by Baicker and Skinner (2011) models the efficiency of 
raising revenues to finance rising health care costs in the US (and elsewhere as health 
care costs are rising more quickly than economic growth in many OECD countries). 
The authors develop a macroeconomic model that accounts for increases in health care 
spending that improve longevity but need to be funded through increased taxation. In a 
comparison of raising revenue through increased marginal tax rates versus less 
progressive payroll tax, they find substantial declines in economic growth with the 
former: an 11 percent decline in GDP relative to the baseline of no distortionary impact 
of tax financing. The efficiency costs are lower when less progressive taxes are used to 
finance the increase in costs, although this is associated with lower income individuals 
paying a larger share of the overall costs. Not surprisingly, the efficiency cost is also 
lower when less revenue is required to achieve the same health gains (increased 
productivity of health spending).  
 
Cost Sharing and User Fees 
The third collection mechanism used in a variety of health systems is user 
charges or fees (co-payments and other forms of cost sharing). These generally consist 
of some form of positive price charged to the user at the point of service and from an 
economic theory point of view can all be modeled as consumer prices (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde, 2011). User fees generally have two purposes, first as a mechanism for 
revenue collection, and second as a mechanism to achieve a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Regarding the second, allocative efficiency, several studies (c.f. Pauly, 1974) 
have shown that in the presence of moral hazard, the optimal theoretical solution 
includes some cost sharing for some services. The principal problem here is that the 
individual has information and control over future health states that the insurer cannot 
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observe. This moral hazard problem results in the individual consuming excess care 
and taking less preventative action. The optimal solution in this case is for the insured 
individual to retain part of the losses (Pauly, 1974). Others have argued that for non-
elective procedures cost sharing may lead to inefficient outcomes as individuals place a 
high value on the care purchased from insurance payouts when ill. In this setting 
individuals purchase insurance not to avoid risk necessarily, but for a claim on 
additional income when sick (Nyman, 2003).  
In the case of cost sharing for the purpose of revenue collection, it is not clear, 
given the administrative costs involved, and the equity considerations, that user fees are 
an optimal means of supplementing taxes and contributions in developed health 
systems. Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2011) note that strict assumptions about the 
limitations of public financing mechanisms for the health care budget are required for 
user fees to be optimal as a part of the revenue-raising basket, namely that that 
government subsidies remain fixed in the presence of user fees (i.e. that government 
funds are not crowded out) and that the additional revenue is used to increase the 
quantity or quality of health services. 
International evidence on the effects of various forms of user fees as a 
supplemental collection mechanism is consistent with theory and evidence from the 
United States. Evidence from Canada, for example, which examines how individuals 
who need to pay out of pocket for prescription drugs use care relative to those who do 
not, suggests a negative demand elasticity in the order of those found in the RAND 
experiment (around -0.2 for prescription drug coverage) and greater use of publicly 
financed doctor services (Finkelstein, 2002; Stabile, 2001). Evidence from Canada that 
examines increases in user fees for prescription drugs also finds negative health effects 
and increased emergency room use for older and low-income users (Tamblyn et al., 
2001). Evidence from France, where voluntary health insurance reimburses user fees 
for publicly financed services, suggests that voluntary insurance increases utilization 
and, therefore, publicly financed costs (Buchmueller et al., 2004). The relationship 
between out-of-pocket prices and utilization holds in a number of other countries in the 
OECD and across a broader spectrum of low- and middle-income countries (Gertler 
and Hammer, 1997). Using the introduction of referenced based pricing in parts of 
Canada as a quasi-experiment (where a fee is applied to a user if he/she chooses a drug 
in the same class as the reference drug but at a higher cost), Grootendorst and Stewart 
(2006) find only modest declines in overall drug expenditure when comparing changes 
in expenditures in the province that introduced referenced-based pricing to those that 
did not. However, the authors note that part of the reason for the small behavioral 
response found here may be that the policy was either not applicable or not binding for 
many users, limiting the potential for savings. There is some evidence of movement 
towards strategies that promote efficiency through value-based cost sharing (using cost 
sharing to encourage patients to use medication, services, and providers that offer better 
value than other options) rather than simply applying user fees across the board (Stabile 
et al, 2013). 
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Overall, the evidence summarized above and reported in table 2 reveals policy 
changes across countries to improve financing incentives and encourage efficient use of 
health services. The evidence suggests that collection mechanisms alone are not 
effective in managing health care costs or quality. Some evidence suggests that 
financing through social insurance is associated with higher cost growth over time than 
financing through general tax revenues, but public spending on health tends to track 
GDP more closely (particularly in recessions) in tax-financed systems than in systems 
financed through social insurance.  
 
4. Pooling Risk 
 
 This section examines the literature on options for pooling risk and managing 
adverse selection and implications for health system efficiency and costs. The major 
empirical findings are highlighted in Table 3. Problems with adverse selection have 
long been recognized in the health insurance literature. Individuals with higher 
expected costs will be more likely to seek more generous insurance, and insurance 
providers in a voluntary competitive market will need to price insurance offerings at 
costs above the average value of the benefits package to offset the higher expected 
costs of both benefits and selection (Cutler and Reber, 1998). This can result in benefits 
packages that are unaffordable for many high-cost individuals. Risk pooling designed 
to counter these concerns has been a primary objective of many health systems. Since 
information about individuals’ health insurance costs is imperfect and asymmetric, 
perfect risk adjustment across individuals is unattainable. Second-best solutions in the 
presence of imperfect information lead to a number of potential problems in practice, 
including residual selection, blunted incentives for providers to manage care, a 
misallocation of individuals across plans, or a reduction in choice of insurers and type 
of coverage.  
  The theoretical literature on risk pooling offers a number of strategies for 
dealing with adverse selection given imperfect information. One obvious solution is for 
governments to create a single, mandatory pool or to have multiple pools but without 
competition and choice between pools. While the clear upside to these solutions is the 
elimination of adverse selection problems, there may also be efficiency costs due to the 
uncompetitive nature of the insurance market.  
Governments that wish to preserve universal access to insurance without using a 
single pool or eliminating consumer choice of insurer can pursue a set of alternate 
strategies to manage risk selection. They can provide subsidies to individuals - cash 
transfers, vouchers, tax-favored treatment, tax credits, etc - to enable them to purchase 
high-cost insurance. van de Ven and Schut (2011) note that premium subsidies are 
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unlikely to be optimal for three reasons: they reduce the incentive for efficient 
purchasing of insurance by high-risk individuals; they encourage excess purchase of 
insurance and the resulting moral hazard effects (Zweifel and Manning, 2000); and they 
may create a misallocation of subsides if the magnitude of the premium is based on 
elements that are not relevant for the level of the subsidy (such as differences in 
efficiency among health insurers or regional differences in prices). In contrast, risk-
adjusted subsidies, where payments are based on observable risk factors such as age, 
sex, and health status, retain consumer price sensitivity and can be adjusted over time to 
reflect changes in consumer risk (van de Ven, 2006). Risk-adjusted subsidies can be 
given to individuals or to insurers. Alternatively, governments can regulate rates and 
insurance plan features and then compensate plans for the expected risk pool after the 
fact (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). 
Where subsidies are provided by government to the insurer, individuals are then 
charged a community-rated contribution for insurance that is not based on their 
expected costs. van de Ven and Schut (2011) refer to subsidies provided to insurers as 
risk equalization and note that these are far more common in practice than subsidies 
provided to individuals, due to lower transaction costs. The ultimate success of these 
risk adjustment mechanisms depends on ability to determine risk (van de Ven et al., 
2000). Glazer and McGuire (2000) show that in an optimal risk adjustment framework, 
prices paid to insurers should not only reflect differences in costs across patients, but 
also provide incentives for higher quality care for the types of patients likely to enroll 
in the plan. Under this type of framework, risk adjustment payments would overpay 
insurers relative to payments based solely on average costs (Glazer and McGuire, 
2000).  
  Brown et al. (2011) show that firms will respond to risk adjustment models by 
a) reducing their screening efforts along the dimensions included in the model and b) 
selecting patients conditional on risk adjustment and based on characteristics not 
included in the risk adjustment formula. These efforts can result in increases rather than 
decreases in the differential payments (the original payment given to the insurer to 
cover someone minus the counterfactual costs if the government had covered the costs 
for the person) which would be counter to the objectives of the government in 
providing the risk adjustment to the insurer.  
The European health systems in this review with competitive health insurance - 
Germany and Switzerland - have significantly improved their risk equalization schemes 
in the last ten years and now have relatively sophisticated formulas that include health-
based risk adjusters (Thomson et al, 2013). In spite of this, insurers’ incentives to select 
risks can be substantial and there continues to be (largely circumstantial) evidence of 
risk selection (van de Ven et al, 2007) and hence potential inefficiencies in risk pooling.  
Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) investigate the effects of the 1996 German reforms 
that allowed for greater competition among sickness funds to test for evidence of risk 
selection by company-based sickness funds. The reforms increased the number of 
2014/05   
14 ! !
people switching between sickness funds from around 6 percent pre reform to 10 
percent three years after the reform. The paper suggests that healthier workers had 
lower switching costs and therefore were more likely to switch funds (to company-
based funds and regional funds, so switching may not have been due to targeted 
selection efforts on the part of company-based funds but rather driven by individual 
selection) and that company-based funds with lower premiums enjoyed a healthier pool 
of enrollees as a result of the reforms.  
 The Swiss system also promotes choice for individuals and competition among 
health insurance providers. Swiss residents can choose among 35 different sellers of 
insurance for the statutory health insurance package (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). All 
individuals are required to obtain statutory coverage and, as noted above, there is risk 
equalization run by the state on a Canton by Canton basis. Colombo (2001) investigates 
the effects of consumer choice in this context and finds there is little switching 
behavior, with only 3.9% of people switching in a given year. Frank and Lamiraud 
(2009) show that switching behavior actually declines as the number of options 
available in the Swiss context increases.  
 Risk selection also can be exacerbated by the functioning of the voluntary 
health insurance market when consumer purchasing decisions for the two forms of 
insurance are linked. For example, if consumers have strong incentives to purchase 
voluntary insurance from the same insurer from whom they purchase statutory or 
compulsory coverage (for reasons of convenience or legal requirement), and if selection 
is permitted in the voluntary market and desirable for insurers but difficult in the 
statutory market, then selection in the voluntary market may affect selection in the 
statutory market. This could limit consumer mobility in the statutory market. Swiss 
citizens are able to purchase complementary voluntary insurance to cover services 
excluded from the statutory benefits package such as some drugs, access to certain 
physicians and treatment outside the Canton of residence. Swiss insurers can sell 
complementary benefits to individuals that hold statutory coverage with the same 
insurer. In contrast to statutory plans, complementary plans are not risk adjusted or 
community rated. Paolucci et al (2006) review whether the complementary insurance 
market can be used to undermine risk adjustment across a number of jurisdictions 
(including Switzerland). They explore how the probability that the voluntary market 
will be used for selection in the statutory market varies with the strength of incentives 
for risk selection in the statutory market and the strength of the links between statutory 
and voluntary insurance and find prima facie evidence that risk adjustment in the 
statutory insurance market is hampered through selection in the voluntary market, 
particularly in Switzerland.  
Additional evidence by Lehmann and Zweifel (2004) examines a major Swiss 
insurance company that also offers a managed care option to better understand the 
extent of risk selection versus innovation in explaining the cost differences between 
insurance options in the Swiss context. They conclude that while there is favorable risk 
selection into lower cost insurance options such as managed care – selection that is not 
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fully captured by the simple risk adjustment mechanism – most cost savings are due to 
contractual innovation on the part of the managed-care organization. 
Although the European countries have put in place numerous mechanisms to 
allow individuals to move easily from one insurer to another (open enrolment, full 
cover of pre-existing conditions, standardized benefits etc) and to facilitate insurer 
competition for members (the option for premium variation and risk adjustment), there 
is some evidence of barriers to switching for older and apparently less healthy people 
and, in Switzerland, of ‘inertia’ in the face of multiple insurance options. This suggests 
two things: first, choice of insurer may not be as great a stimulus to enhancing 
efficiency and quality as expected if insurers only risk losing low-cost individuals, and 
therefore do not face incentives to improve care for higher-cost individuals but instead 
compete only for the low risks. Second, there may be a point beyond which insurance 
options present information problems that lead to inertia and loss of value for the 
consumer. Thus, the transaction costs of insurer competition may be high for 
individuals and the health system. 
 The evidence from Germany and Switzerland reviewed above is consistent with 
evidence from the US Medicare market. A recent paper by Brown et al. (2011) 
investigates differences between traditional Medicare programs for older people and 
private “Medicare Advantage” (MA) programs. Despite the fact that these must be 
offered at the same price as traditional Medicare programs, and the fact that the 
government implemented differential payment to these programs based on patient risk 
scores, MA programs have disproportionately enrolled lower-cost individuals. 
Newhouse et al. (2012) also investigate recent steps taken to reduce favorable selection 
into MA programs, including improved risk adjustment through better use of diagnostic 
information on inpatient and outpatient claims forms and changes to make it more 
difficult to leave MA monthly (called a partial enrollment “lock-in” that kept people in 
MA for the final nine months of the year). They conclude that risk selection was greatly 
reduced, although not to zero. Therefore, despite government intervention there is still 
evidence of some risk selection among insurers in the United States.  
US empirical economic literature on the demand for insurance has advanced our 
understanding of who seeks insurance and why over the past decade. The classical 
economics literature worked from the premise that buying insurance is more attractive 
for riskier individuals. The more likely an individual is to need care, the more likely 
he/she is to buy insurance. For a given price, therefore, sicker individuals are more 
likely to buy insurance, all else equal. Einav and Finkelstein (2011) note that 
competitive pricing responds to the average insured individual while efficient pricing 
should be based on the marginal individual who is less risky than the average 
individual. Therefore, insurance prices tend to be too high, leading to under-insurance 
in the presence of adverse selection. 
In recent work, however, Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010) find that there are 
a number of other dimensions to the demand for insurance beyond risk, including, 
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importantly, risk aversion. For example, in the US long-term care market, they found 
that in addition to predicted use of long-term care, individuals who exhibit more 
precautionary behavior (through preventative measures such as seat belt use and getting 
flu shots) are more likely to buy long-term care (advantageous rather than adverse 
selection), and less likely to use long-term care, thereby eliminating adverse selection 
in this market (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). Fang et al. (2008) also find further 
evidence of “advantageous” selection in the US Medigap insurance market, along a 
number of non-health or risk-related dimensions. Similar results are found in voluntary 
health insurance markets in European countries (Bolin et al., 2010). In light of this 
empirical evidence, Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) estimate the efficiency 
consequences of selection in the context of a large firm and find only modest welfare 
costs from adverse selection. Thus, while all of the studies reported find evidence of 
some adverse selection, the extent of this selection, and the presence of advantageous 
selection in some cases, suggest that the welfare loss traditionally associated with 
adverse selection may be less than previously thought and that concerns about it may 
have been overstated. 
 
In conclusion, the evidence reviewed above and summarized in Table 3 
suggests that countries with competing pools experience similar difficulties with 
selection and are adopting more sophisticated forms of risk adjustment. The nature of 
the market for voluntary insurance can play a role in exacerbating selection. Recent 
evidence suggests that more detailed data on use, coupled with restrictions on ability to 
change insurer, can significantly mitigate risk selection. 
 
5. Purchasing Services 
 
All health systems require the purchase of a wide range of goods and services 
provided by hospitals, labs, pharmaceutical companies, physicians and other care 
givers. The purchasing function may be carried out by government agencies, insurers, 
groups of doctors acting on behalf of patients or patients themselves. It involves 
decisions about what services to buy, from whom, at what price and under what 
conditions. Many OECD health systems have experimented with policies intended to 
strengthen the purchasing function by moving away from passive reimbursement of 
providers. Common tools adopted in recent years include hospital competition, activity-
based payment for hospital services (or Diagnosis Related Groups, (DRGs) a system 
which classifies hospital cases/procedures into groups and then assigns payment prices 
for these groups) and the linking of provider payment to performance and outcomes 
(pay-for-performance, P4P). We review the literature on recent innovations in hospital 
competition and provider payment below, and summarize the empirical literature in 
Table 4. 
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Hospital Competition 
The National Health Service (NHS) in England has, in the last twenty years, 
engaged in several experiments to foster patient choice of hospital and encourage 
hospital competition. The extent to which hospital competition improves quality or 
prices may differ depending on the nature of the market. For a thorough review of the 
nature of competition in health care markets and a summary of the recent research in 
this area, see Gaynor and Town (2011). In many markets prices are set by regulators, 
leading to non-price competition based on quality. Hospital quality is inherently hard to 
measure and has multiple dimensions. Some dimensions, such as waiting times are 
relatively easy to measure. Others, such as risk-adjusted mortality can be more difficult 
to quantify. The theoretical effects of competition under fixed prices are increased 
quality, with a greater effect where there is a larger number of firms in the market; 
quality will also increase as regulated prices increase (Gaynor and Town, 2011). 
Propper et al. (2004) and Propper et al. (2008) argue that in markets with stricter budget 
constraints (generally where there are large government purchasers or where purchaser 
budgets are determined by governments), prices will be relatively more important and 
therefore hospitals will compete on prices instead of on quality. The theoretical effect 
on quality in this case is indeterminate and may result in quality below efficient levels. 
Evidence from a variety of reforms in England are generally consistent with 
these predictions. In the early 1990s the creation of an internal market through a 
purchaser-provider split allowed District Health Authorities (DHAs) with responsibility 
for meeting the health needs of their local population to purchase services from 
hospitals. The aim was to make hospitals compete for the business of DHAs and of 
groups of GPs who held funds to purchase care for their patients (“GP fundholders”), 
thereby improving efficiency and quality. Following a change of government in 1997, 
the purchaser-provider split remained in place and new geographically defined primary 
care trusts (PCTs) were set up to purchase services from primary care providers and 
hospitals. In the mid 2000s, the government experimented with a variant of GP 
fundholding known as practice-based commissioning (Bevan and van de Ven, 2010). 
And in 2013 a new government established clinical commissioning groups to facilitate 
purchasing by groups of GPs. 
Propper et al. (2004) examine the effects of hospital competition on mortality. 
They define catchment areas for each hospital, capture the number of hospitals in each 
area, then weight this measure by the population each area serves. Their findings 
suggest that increased hospital competition reduced quality; hospitals located in areas 
with more competition had higher death rates than those in areas with lower levels of 
competition, controlling for observable differences in patient and hospital 
characteristics. The size of the effect is small but robust. In a follow-up study, however, 
Propper et al. (2008) note that where outcomes are easily observable (wait times), 
hospitals had to compete on both price and quality (wait times) and competition led to 
improvements, but at the expense of quality measures that are more difficult to observe. 
Other evidence reviewed in Bevan and van de Ven (2010) suggests that NHS hospitals 
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increased productivity and that while wait times appeared to improve under GP 
fundholding there did not appear to be much evidence of a reduction in costs.  
 The GP fundholder model was in place from 1991 to 1999 when it was 
abolished. Dusheiko et al. (2006) use this policy reversal to examine the effects of 
supply-side cost sharing on physician behavior. They find strong evidence that GP 
fundholding resulted in a decline in secondary admissions (as would be predicted by 
the theory). They find no evidence that the result of this was a substitution of 
emergency admissions for elective admissions through a GP. This suggests that 
incentivizing the gatekeeping function of GPs does result in less utilization, potentially 
resulting in worse care for patients. However, we review other effects of the reforms 
below (such as improved wait times for patients who were in GP fundholder groups) 
and a complete analysis of the welfare effects of such policies would need to take into 
account the combined effects. 
 Further reforms in England sought increased patient choice of the location, time 
and day of elective surgery to reduce waiting times and improve quality through 
competition, with money “following the patient” (DRGs) (Dixon et al, 2010). The 
reforms, commonly referred to as “Choose and Book”, were slow to get off the ground. 
Dixon et al. (2010) report that as of 2008, less than half of GP referrals for outpatient 
appointments used the new system. Gaynor et al. (2010) examine evidence of increased 
consumer choice through “Choose and Book” and the introduction of DRGs. Using 
discharge data and comparing variation in market structure across hospitals through 
market concentration, they found that hospitals competed on quality, resulting in 
improvements in mortality and length of stay. In a follow-up paper (Gaynor et al., 
2012) the authors estimate a structural demand model using data from the same reforms 
for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. Their estimates confirm that reforms 
giving patients choice of hospital increased patient elasticity of demand with respect to 
service quality. They found considerable heterogeneity in their estimates, with sicker 
patients responding more to the reform, but did not find significant response differences 
by income (Gaynor et al., 2012). 
Cooper et al. (2010) also examine the effects of increased competition in the 
NHS using a difference-in-differences approach with “exposure” to competition and 
time as the two differences. They find that while increased competition among public 
sector hospitals improved productivity through shorter length of stay (particularly for 
pre surgery), competition between public and private hospitals had the opposite effect, 
with post-surgery length of stay increasing in public hospitals as a result of competition 
(pre-surgery lengths of stay remained relatively unchanged). The authors offer patient 
selection (less complicated patients being drawn to the private sector) as an explanation 
for these differing effects.  
 Evidence from Australia also suggests mixed benefits from increased 
competition in a context where public and private hospitals are competing for patients 
and have multiple payers (both government and private insurance). Australia has a 
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relatively high share of procedures in private hospitals, at around 30% of all inpatient 
admissions, and high levels of private insurance coverage, at around 45% of the 
population (Palangkaraya and Yong, 2013). In a setting where public hospitals and 
private hospitals compete on price and quality, Palangkaraya and Yong (2013) examine 
the effects of hospital competition on mortality and readmissions using hospital 
discharge data. Their evidence suggests that competition has mixed effects on quality: a 
small increase in mortality but a larger decrease in unplanned readmissions. However, 
the research setting here does not allow for quasi-experimental control for other factors 
that may be associated with greater competition, which might bias the results.  
 Once again, the evidence from the UK and Australia is consistent with evidence 
from the introduction of drug coverage through Medicare Part D in the United States. 
Research there suggests that the mechanisms used by government to purchase 
prescription drugs, i.e. moving patients from individual purchasers to members of an 
insured group, can have strong effects on market outcomes including lowering optimal 
prices (in contrast to the standard insurance finding of an increase in prices). Their 
findings come from insurers as part of the Medicare Part D program which bundles 
insurance with a formulary and group purchasing. The reasons behind this counter-
intuitive result include the ability of insurance plans to bundle insurance with 
formularies and other mechanisms to create elastic demand. Individuals, unlike 
insurance plans, are not well informed about the substitutability of drugs, and doctors 
are generally not well informed about negotiated prices. Insurance plans, on the other 
hand, are able to provide rules and incentives to take advantage of both of these 
resulting in lower prices. (Duggan and Scott Morton, 2010).  
 In sum, the literature finds mixed effects of competition on quality. This may be 
partly due to differences in quality measures with fairly uniform evidence on the 
relationship between quality and wait times and more mixed evidence on quality 
measures that are harder to consistently measure such as risk-adjusted mortality.  
   
Provider Payment: DRGs and Pay-For-Performance 
The introduction of Diagnosis Related Groups to pay for hospital care has been 
a major trend across OECD countries. Expressed policy reasons for this move include 
increased efficiency, transparency, the ability to increase volumes for select services, 
and cost-containment. A review of the evidence across Europe suggests that greater use 
of DRGs led to an increase in admission rates and a decline in the average length of 
stay, as would be predicted, suggesting improvements in quality (Busse et al., 2012). 
Evidence on the effect of DRGs on overall system costs, as distinct from per-unit costs, 
is more difficult to ascertain, with some evidence of higher overall costs in France and 
limited evidence on costs in the UK and Germany (O’Reilly et al, 2012).  
Reform of physician payment has mainly focused on linking payment to 
performance and the United Kingdom has experimented more substantially with P4P 
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than any other European country. P4P was introduced to pay UK GPs in 2003, with 
25% of GP income tied to meeting quality targets in a system known as the ‘Quality 
and Outcomes Framework’ (QOF) (Gravelle et al, 2008). QOF uses a list of 65 clinical 
quality indicators for patients in the practice. Payments are linearly related to the 
number of patients who achieve the indicators as a ratio of those suitable for the 
indicator. When patients are not suitable for the indicator they are considered 
“exceptions”. This ensures that quality measures are not applied to those patients for 
whom they are not appropriate. However, it also allows GPs to exclude patients for 
whom they cannot reach the quality standards. Gravelle et al. (2008) investigate both 
the degree to which GPs are meeting quality standards and the magnitude of exception 
reporting using GP data from Scotland. The results suggest that over 90% of practices 
achieved the highest level of pay for performance and that these practices exceeded the 
standard required to maximize pay. Only 1% of patients seemed inappropriately 
excepted. However, a follow-up study by Gravelle et al. (2010) uses provider level data 
to test whether physicians gamed the system to take advantage of the available financial 
rewards by not only increasing the number of patients treated successfully but also by 
decreasing the number of patients eligible for treatment thereby improving their ratios 
of treated patients and improving their financial reward and find evidence of such 
gaming behavior. 
In terms of the effects of QOF on patient outcomes, the evidence suggests 
mixed success. Campbell et al. (2007) examine the improvements in UK primary care 
using a longitudinal cohort study that spans the introduction of pay for performance and 
focuses on the management of three major chronic conditions: asthma, coronary heart 
disease and type 2 diabetes. While the authors note improvements in practice quality 
for all three of these groups over the 1998 to 2005 period, the improvements began 
before the introduction of QOF and are in evidence both for those clinical indicators 
that received financial incentives for improvement and those that did not. They 
conclude that QOF is associated only with a modest acceleration in improvement for 
asthma and diabetes. 
A second investigation on the effects of QOF on quality of care by Serumaga et 
al. (2011) focuses on patients with hypertension. The study compares cohorts who 
started treatment in 2000 (several years before the introduction of pay for performance 
in the UK) with those who started six months before the introduction of pay for 
performance. They conclude that there were no changes in incidence of adverse 
outcomes or mortality related to hypertension as a result of the implementation of pay 
for performance. 
 More recent evidence from a hospital P4P program (Sutton et al., 2012) uses a 
difference-in-differences framework to examine the changes in mortality for patients 
admitted with pneumonia, heart failure and AMI before and after the introduction of the 
Advancing Quality program – a hospital based pay for performance program 
introduced in the north-west region of England but not in the rest of the country. The 
findings suggest improvements in mortality relative to the rest of the country and the 
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authors note that in comparison to other programs that have not found such large results 
the program had larger bonuses and greater investment by hospitals in quality-
improvement activities.  
 The evidence from the UK is reflected in evidence from the US. For example, in 
the Medicaid market, Duggan (2004) finds that government contracts with HMOs to 
take on Medicaid patients resulted in higher costs per patient with no corresponding 
improvement in (infant) health outcomes. A review of the broader literature on P4P by 
Rosenthal and Frank (2006) suggests that the empirical evidence in support of pay-for-
performance in the US is weak. They note that among the health care studies reviewed, 
many show no results. They also note, however, that many of these studies were small 
scale interventions that may not have been picked up by physicians, and that the lack of 
outcomes here, therefore, may not be generalizable to larger scale interventions.  
  
Overall there has been convergence towards more use of market-like 
mechanisms in OECD health systems. These include wide adoption of DRGs to pay 
hospitals, attempts to encourage hospital competition and, more recently, greater efforts 
to link provider payment to performance. The evidence on hospital competition 
(summarized in Table 4) suggests that where outcomes are easily observable or targeted 
(such as wait times) hospitals compete on price and quality (wait times), leading to 
improved outcomes.  
 
6. Coverage Decisions 
 
 Decisions about whom to cover (breadth), what to cover (scope) and how much 
of the cost to cover (depth) may have implications for efficiency, costs, and quality. In 
addition to coverage decisions, governments in many jurisdictions are often able to 
determine how quickly to provide services. Systems with fixed budgets or other budget 
constraint mechanisms for health care provision generally employ price and non-price 
rationing to control access and costs within the publicly financed system. One of the 
most common non-price rationing mechanisms is to limit access to care through wait 
lists. Indeed, long waiting times and care rationed by mechanisms other than price are 
often expressed concerns in US policy debates around an increased role for government 
in the health care sector (c.f. Esmail, 2009). Here, we focus on coverage breadth and 
scope and on waiting times (given the large role it plays in the debate around rationing 
care), as we discussed coverage depth in the sub-section on user fees above. The 
empirical evidence reviewed is summarized in Table 5. 
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Demand For Insurance and Coverage Breadth and Scope 
 As all the countries that we review here have universal or nearly universal 
coverage, we examine the literature on the demand for insurance that complements 
these systems and hence helps define public coverage decisions. We do not address 
literature on the demand for insurance that supplements or “tops up” public coverage 
here1, with the exception of the subsidies for insurance through tax systems, as it does 
not relate directly to coverage decisions within the public system (see Thomson and 
Mossialos, 2009 and Stabile and Townsend, 2013 for reviews of this literature).  
While doctors and hospital services are universally and uniquely covered by the 
provincial health insurance plans in Canada, coverage of other services, such as 
pharmaceuticals, dental services, and other non-hospital or doctor based care is not 
universal. These services are covered by a mix of private and public insurance and 
public subsidy, depending on province of residence, age, and income (Stabile, 2001). 
Several studies have looked at the financing and equity implications of this mixed 
public and private coverage, particularly around prescription drug coverage which has 
been one of the fasting growing components of health care costs in Canada over the 
past few decades (Alan et al, 2005).  
Research on the effects of public drug insurance programs explores the equity 
and cost implications of changes in pharmaceutical coverage from age-based coverage 
to income-based coverage. In British Columbia, prior to 2003 the government provided 
coverage for individuals age 65 and older (similar to US Medicare). In 2003 the 
province switched from age-based coverage to an income -based coverage program 
where the amount of coverage, deductible and cost sharing varied by family income. 
The explicit goals of the policy change were a) to make the provincial drug program 
more sustainable and b) to increase fairness and equity within the drug program 
(Hanley et al., 2008). A review of the equity consequences of the shift from age to 
needs-based coverage suggests that the coverage change did result in a less regressive 
drug program in BC in terms of the out of pocket funds paid for drugs. This change was 
driven by an increase in the out-of-pocket costs paid by higher income seniors 
following the policy change. Although the overall effect was to make the program less 
regressive, the average out of pocket costs for low-income households also increased 
(Hanley et al., 2008).  
Apart from targeted public drug insurance programs, the government of Canada 
provides significant subsidy for the purchase of voluntary health insurance through the 
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insurance from personal taxable income. The most recent review of these tax 
expenditures suggest that they are in the order of $3 billion annually (Department of 
Finance Canada, 2011). Research examining the implications of these subsidies on 
linking voluntary health insurance to the labor market suggest that there is a larger 
impact of the subsidies on the probability that small firms offer insurance in Canada (as 
well as the US) and less likely to affect the decision of larger firms to offer insurance 
given the other advantages (large risk pools and administrative efficiencies) available to 
large firms (Stabile, 2002). The evidence here suggests that in the absence of these 
subsidies, complementary drug coverage offered through small firms would decline 
significantly (in the order of 50%).  
In addition to subsidizing the purchase of insurance through an employer, the 
Canadian system, like the US system, allows for deductions and credits for out of 
pocket health care expenditures when these expenditures exceed a certain share of 
personal income. As with the employer deduction, the subsidy varies with the 
individual’s marginal tax rate. Evidence exploring the effects of these subsidies also 
confirms significant tax-price elasticities with respect to all health care expenditures, 
and with respect to the purchase of voluntary health insurance (Smart and Stabile, 
2005). There is no evidence, however, that these subsidies affect the purchase of health 
insurance on the intensive margin. This is likely because both insurance premiums and 
out-of-pocket spending are eligible for the tax credit, leaving the relative price of 
market health insurance and self insurance unchanged in Canada (Smart and Stabile, 
2005). In sum, the subsidies have increased coverage rates substantially, but at the cost 
of significant public revenue loss and reduced equity.  
 Australia has also promoted voluntary private health insurance along with the 
public system through the use of tax subsidies through large universal rebates on 
private insurance purchases, lifetime community rating based on the age that insurance 
is first purchased, as well as tax surcharges on high earners who do not purchase private 
insurance. Evidence on the effects of these large subsidies on insurance take up 
unsurprisingly finds large increases in private insurance take up (Hurley et al, 2002) 
and selection into insurance by individuals who expect to be heavy users of hospital 
services (Savage and Wright, 2003). Additionally, the evidence suggests that the 
combination of tax subsidies and the effects of private systems on the health care input 
costs (both in the short and long run) limit the potential cost savings for the public 
sector (Hurley et al., 2002). The authors note that there is no conclusive evidence from 
Australia that shows a decline in public waiting times following the introduction of a 
parallel private system, nor that public costs were reduced when the overall cost of the 
policies are taken into account.  
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Economic Evaluation and Coverage Scope 
Many health systems employ health technology assessment (HTA) and various 
degrees of economic evaluation (for example, cost effectiveness analysis) to determine 
what the publicly financed benefits package should cover. In addition to considering 
whether a particular service or treatment should be funded, assessing bodies can also 
consider best practices within accepted treatments to reduce harmful or costly treatment 
variation. HTA is not, however, unique to publicly financed insurance – all payers must 
decide what they will and will not pay for, and many attempt to elicit best practices 
from their providers to ensure quality, safety and efficiency. There is an extensive 
literature on methods of economic evaluation (c.f. Drummond et al., 2005, Garber, 
2000). Garber (2000), building on Garber and Phelps (1997), explores the relationship 
between economic analysis and decision making by the insurer. Where the decision is 
based on the average risk in the population, the insurance company or public insurer 
will cover those services with the maximum net benefit. Garber and Phelps note that 
only those services whose expected benefits equal or exceed costs will be insured and 
these will be included in the premium. In the case of a government insurer, it is 
possible that a broader set of costs and benefits will be used in any economic 
evaluation, as all costs and benefits to society should be relevant. This may lead to 
different decisions about what to cover. The perspective of a managed-care company, 
for example, would ignore producer surplus. However, given that the relevant 
population for government may not include producers outside the boundaries of the 
state this distinction is perhaps not as applicable in practice (Pauly, 1995 and Garber, 
2000). 
Several countries have set up bodies aimed at increasing the use of health 
technology assessment. For example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) was established in England in 1999 to ensure that treatment 
decisions would be based on the best available clinical evidence, and many other 
countries have followed suit. However, evidence of the effectiveness of HTA is limited. 
Evidence from NICE suggests, for example, that very few appraisals of new 
technologies have had a negative outcome (NICE, 2010). Where NICE has 
recommended restricting the use of technologies, there have been some savings to the 
National Health Service, but part of the cost has been shifted to patients, limiting 
overall cost containment (Richards, 2008).  
 
Access to Care and Wait Times 
In the absence of prices as a form of demand control, the optimal wait for care 
will be one that balances marginal social costs and marginal social benefits. Assuming 
that the longer the wait for inpatient treatment, the lower the total cost of care in present 
value terms, then the optimal wait will depend both on total costs and the nature of the 
benefit curve – i.e. how the benefit of treatment changes with delay in being treated. In 
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contrast to a market clearing price, waiting imposes a cost on the patient by delaying 
care; it also results in a deadweight loss as there is lost consumer surplus and no gain to 
the producer. Gravelle and Siciliani (2008) note that in the presence of moral hazard 
some wait time may be optimal, but the assumptions required for such a result to be 
welfare increasing include that the marginal cost of waiting be higher for patients with 
a smaller benefit from treatment (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2008). If wait times are 
required, it is optimal for those patients who face the greatest gain to receive the 
shortest wait and for those with no potential gain to wait an infinite amount of time. 
However, in the absence of perfect information, shorter wait times should be offered to 
those groups with higher expected gains (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2009). Therefore, 
whereas most private insurance schemes impose a uniform cost across all patients, 
publicly financed care often imposes wait times that will not be uniform, and depend 
instead on the potential gains from treatment and the deadweight loss of waiting.  
 Propper et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between GP fundholding in 
England and wait times. GP fundholding allowed some GPs to purchase services on 
behalf of their patients as part of a larger set of reforms to encourage hospital 
competition and lower wait times (discussed above). All transactions were within the 
publicly financed health care system. The authors examine hospital wait times for over 
100,000 elective hospital admissions in England between 1993 and 1997. They find 
patients with GP fundholders waited less time, all else equal, than non-fundholder 
patients. The longest reductions in waits were found in those areas with the longest wait 
times a priori. They find limited evidence of spillover effects for non-fundholder 
patients or for other areas of practice. They conclude that it was the ability to pay for 
shorter wait times from within the public system, and not the ability to choose the 
hospital for the procedure (fundholders could purchase services without specifically 
paying for lower waits) that resulted in shorter wait times (Propper et al., 2002).   
 Siciliani and Martin (2007) also examine the relationship between increased 
choice in NHS hospitals (through the policies examined above) and wait times using 
data from 120 hospitals between 1999 and 2001. They use similar measures of market 
concentration to Propper et al, 2004 (reviewed above) and find a modest reduction in 
wait times from increased competition. Their results also imply that there is an optimal 
number of hospitals competing with each another and that once the optimal number is 
exceeded (between 11 and 14 hospitals in a catchment area) further increases in the 
number of hospitals competing can result in increased wait times. The authors do not 
provide an explanation for this result, but note that the effect is modest.  
 Research by Cooper et al. (2009) also examines how the policies outlined above 
as well as increased funding by the UK government affected wait times for care. They 
document a steady decline in wait times for hip, knee, and cataract procedures in the 
NHS between 2000 and 2007 (after an initial increase in wait times). As wait times fell, 
the variation in wait time across socioeconomic status also fell, improving equity. 
While the evidence presented is not causal, and the authors do not try and link 
particular parts of the UK reforms to the declines in wait times and improvements in 
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equity, they do claim that “the post 2000 government reforms did not lead to the 
inequitable distribution of wait times across groups that many people predicted” 
(Cooper et al, 2009, p. 5).  
 Propper et al. (2010) examine the use of targets in the UK as a tool to reduce 
wait times. They exploit the natural experiment generated by the introduction of targets 
in the England but not Scotland to identify whether target setting for wait lists led to a 
fall in wait times in England. They find a reduction in waiting times of 13 days on 
average. While levels of elective care rose to reduce wait times, they did not find 
reductions in non-targeted activity to offset these changes. They also find no evidence 
of a fall in patient quality, some evidence of an increase in the quality of care and of 
wait list “manipulation” whereby patients were removed either temporarily or 
permanently from the list. Overall the authors conclude that targets successfully 
lowered wait times in England, with little evidence of adverse side effects.  
 Wait times have been identified as a persistent policy problem in Canada as 
well (Wilcox et al., 2007). A few studies have tried to assess the impact of longer wait 
times in Canada in terms of health outcomes. A challenge in measuring the impact of 
longer waits is that, in addition to any health differences, there may be non-health 
measures such as pain or lost income or leisure that are more difficult to measure. 
However, much of the literature focuses on more easily measured outcomes such as 
length of stay post surgery, or mortality. One such study examines patients with hip 
fractures in Quebec admitted to hospital between 1990 and 1993 (Hamilton et al., 
1996). After controlling for patient health and for both observed and unobserved 
individual and hospital characteristics, wait time for surgery had little effect on post-
surgery length of stay or mortality. Studies in the medical literature looking at open-
heart surgery (Carrier et al., 1993) similarly find little difference in post-operative 
outcomes. However, a study looking at wait times for admission into hospital through 
the emergency room (ER) in Canada found that presenting to an ER when there is a 
longer wait in the ER had a higher risk of short term death or admission (Guttmann et 
al., 2011). The authors use a retrospective cohort study and health administrative data 
from Ontario to track patients who were either seen and discharged or left without 
being seen. They find an increase in both mortality and admission to hospital among 
patients who present during shifts with long mean wait times. However, patients who 
left without being seen were not at increased risk of adverse events.  
 Australia also experiences issues with wait times and the government has 
pushed private insurance through explicit subsidies as both a solution to long wait times 
and increased public expenditures (Vaithianathan, 2002). As noted above, a large 
number of Australians (45%) hold private insurance coverage in order to obtain faster 
and premium service. Johar et al. (2011) explore the extent to which the decision to 
purchase insurance in Australia is a function of expected wait times. Using hospital 
administrative data they model the effect of expected wait time for a procedure on the 
demand for insurance. The authors impute expected wait times using a variety of health 
conditions available in administrative data. Contrary to anecdotal evidence in Australia 
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they find that the demand for insurance is insensitive to expected waiting times, 
although they do find that it is sensitive to wait times for the upper end of the wait time 
distribution. One limitation of the study is that the demand for insurance as modeled 
does not include a number of possible characteristics of private insurance such as 
access to certain doctors. It is also unclear whether perceived long wait times by 
individuals before they actually experience illness isn’t the driving factor in people’s 
decision to seek insurance. Evidence of the difference in wait times for people with and 
without private insurance suggests that privately insured patients receive much faster 
care not only in private hospitals but also in public ones (Johar and Savage, 2010). 
 There is less evidence that wait times are a problem in Germany, France, and 
Switzerland. An international comparison of wait times by Siciliani and Hurst (2004) 
suggests that there is some evidence that those countries that do not report problems 
with wait times spend slightly more, have higher levels of capacity as measured by 
number of hospital beds and doctors per capita, and have higher levels of inpatient 
activities. They are also more likely to use DRGs to pay hospitals (at the time the study 
was carried out; now most use DRGs) and fee-for-service to pay physicians. They do 
not find evidence, however, that countries that do not report high levels of wait times 
are more productive (as measured by inpatients per physician).  
 
In sum, the evidence reviewed above and listed in Table 5 suggests that while wait 
times are not a problem across all countries, where they are a problem, governments 
have been able to reduce them when they have chosen explicitly to focus on achieving 
this goal. Efforts to expand coverage beyond hospital and physician services, or to 
promote voluntary health insurance through tax subsidies have been mixed across 
countries, with some evidence of inefficient use of tax subsidies and other policies to 
promote voluntary insurance alongside publicly financed coverage.  
 
7. Implications for health system efficiency, costs, quality 
 
Lessons Learned 
What lessons can we draw from the evidence summarized above and what 
questions remained unanswered? In terms of collection, many countries are exploring 
new ways of generating revenues for health care to enable them to cope with significant 
cost growth. However, there is little evidence to suggest that collection mechanisms 
alone are effective in managing the cost or quality of care. First, the traditional 
classification of tax-financed versus social insurance systems does not determine how 
countries organize health financing functions to achieve policy goals. The evidence 
available on the relationship between financing and outcomes suggests that health 
systems financed through social insurance (as opposed to general tax revenues) tend to 
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be more regressive and have smaller tax bases. Some evidence suggests that financing 
through social insurance versus general tax revenues is associated with higher cost 
growth over time, although it is difficult, using such a broad classification, to separate 
collection mechanisms from other characteristics more often found in tax-financed 
jurisdictions such as budget and price controls and quasi-hard budget constraints. 
Public health care funding in tax-based systems tends to track GDP more closely than 
in countries that collect funds through social insurance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many 
jurisdictions are moving towards a diversity of funding streams (adding tax-based 
funding to social insurance) to manage health care expenditure growth and maintain 
universality. Theory and evidence on cost sharing through standard user fees suggests 
that for the purpose of revenue collection it is not clear, given the administrative costs 
involved, that user fees are an optimal means of supplementing taxes and contributions 
in developed health systems. The evidence on value-based cost sharing (using cost 
sharing selectively to encourage patients to use medication, services, and providers that 
offer better value than other options, rather than simply applying user fees across the 
board) suggests some efficiency improvements in use of care.  
European systems with competitive health insurance (historically only found in 
countries that use social insurance to finance health care) have multiple risk pools, 
which can lead to selection issues and inefficiencies. All have significantly improved 
their risk equalization schemes in the last ten years and many now have relatively 
sophisticated formulas that include health-based risk adjusters. In spite of this, insurers’ 
incentives to select risks are substantial and there continues to be (largely 
circumstantial) evidence of risk selection and hence potential inefficiencies in risk 
pooling. In some cases such as Switzerland, the voluntary insurance market seems to 
exacerbate risk selection and it would make sense to segment these markets to avoid 
this behavior. Recent evidence from the United States offers two reasons for optimism 
on this front. The first is that risk adjustment continues to improve and there is 
evidence that more detailed data on use, coupled with restrictions on ability to change 
insurer, can significantly mitigate risk selection. As a result, there is likely to continue 
to be convergence across countries towards better risk selection strategies. Second, 
recent empirical evidence examining insurance choice by individuals in the United 
States has found that preferences, in addition to risk, are important determinants of 
insurance choice, so the welfare implications of adverse selection by individuals in 
many markets may be smaller than previously thought. 
Where purchasing is concerned, there has been some convergence among 
OECD health systems towards more use of market-like mechanisms, particularly the 
adoption of DRGs to pay hospitals. Some countries have also attempted to encourage 
hospital competition and, more recently, a growing number of countries have tried to 
link provider payment to performance. The evidence on hospital competition suggests 
that where outcomes are easily observable or targeted (such as wait times) hospitals 
compete on price and quality (wait times), leading to improved outcomes. In some 
cases improvements have been at the expense of quality measures that are more 
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difficult to observe, suggesting that it would be useful to have further comparable, well-
defined measures of quality beyond wait times. However, where prices are set 
administratively, competition has improved productivity and quality. DRG payment 
also appears to have improved productivity and quality, although its effect on overall 
system costs is mixed. There is some evidence (mainly from the United Kingdom) of 
improved physician productivity and patient outcomes following the introduction of 
P4P, although the evidence also suggests a degree of gaming to maximize financial 
incentives. 
 A number of the health systems we explore continue to use wait times as a 
source of non-price rationing. The evidence on the effects of wait times on health 
outcomes is mixed, with more recent studies finding negative effects on patient health 
and readmission rates, and older studies finding little effect on health outcomes. The 
United Kingdom in particular, and to some extent Canada, have significantly reduced 
wait times by increasing volumes using forms of DRG funding loosely modeled on US 
Medicare and through targeted budgets. Wait times are therefore not inherent in tax-
financed systems but can be fairly successfully manipulated by policy levers such as 
targets, DRGs, and non-price competition between hospitals.  
 
Unresolved Questions 
 Our review has revealed some areas where there is a need for a greater evidence 
base. First, while efforts to be more systematic about defining the publicly provided or 
mandated benefits package have increased over the past decade, there is a lack of 
evidence on how effective these changes have been. Organizations such as NICE in the 
United Kingdom, the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies, the German 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, or the French National Health 
Authority, have emerged in many countries in the last decade, showing how 
jurisdictions increasingly recognize the importance of economic evaluation of best 
practice and technologies. However, we found little evidence on the extent to which 
these bodies have achieved their goals and some evidence to suggest they struggle with 
implementation. 
Efforts in systems such as Canada’s to expand coverage beyond hospital and 
physician services, or to promote voluntary insurance through tax subsidies have been 
mixed. A combination of tax deductions and subsidies has resulted in high levels of 
voluntary private insurance coverage for non-publicly financed services but these 
subsidies have led to substantial and poorly targeted tax expenditures and continued 
reliance on the firm as the provider of voluntary coverage. Attempts to provide public 
coverage selectively to older people have also been expensive, while reforms aimed at 
re-targeting benefits based on income have lowered public costs and had some positive 
redistributive consequences. The countries we examine therefore provide evidence of 
the inefficiencies of tax subsidies and of inefficiencies associated with voluntary 
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insurance alongside publicly financed coverage, but do not provide particularly helpful 
evidence on the efficient mix of public and private finance.  
The past ten to fifteen years have seen high health care cost growth in many 
countries, including all those reviewed here, with average health care cost growth 
exceeding the average growth in GDP (Haigst and Kotlikoff, 2005). In considering the 
success of different health systems in controlling costs, the evidence suggests that while 
policies that effectively limit demand through rationing and fixed budgets appear still 
to be effective at holding down costs at a point in time, there has been a discernible 
shift in policies employed by the countries we review away from these types of cost 
containment strategies, and away from other strategies that simply shift costs to 
households, towards policies that focus more on the cost-benefit ratio and efficiency, 
such as greater use of health technology assessment and activity-based funding with 
administratively set prices. While there are high hopes that these strategies will produce 
a more efficient use of health care resource and, ideally, control cost growth, further 
research is needed to determine the extent to which these policies achieve their goals.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 This review examines the changing role of government in financing health care 
outside the United States. It focuses on policy choices made by a number of OECD 
countries around four financing functions – raising revenue, pooling risk, purchasing 
services, and making coverage decisions. It reviews the evidence of the effects of these 
choices on efficiency, costs and quality. In doing so it offers some insight into how 
nations with universal or near universal health coverage are performing as they grapple 
with having to finance increased health care costs, seek to avoid risk selection in their 
insurance pools, and promote efficiency in the purchase and use of health care services 
at all levels of the system.  
 Each health system has unique attributes that help explain some of the behavior 
of providers and patients. Nevertheless, many of the empirical studies reviewed here 
offer supporting evidence that crosses jurisdictions. Indeed there has been some 
convergence in policies adopted across countries to improve financing incentives and 
encourage efficient utilization. In the case of risk pooling, all countries with competing 
pools are experiencing similar difficulties with selection and are adopting more 
sophisticated forms of risk adjustment. In the case of hospital competition, the key 
drivers of success appear to be what is competed on and measurable rather than 
whether the system is public or private. In the case of both the success of pay for 
performance and issues resulting from wait times, evidence differs both within and 
across jurisdictions. However, the evidence does suggest that a number of governments 
have effectively reduced wait times when they have chosen explicitly to focus 
incentives on achieving this goal.  
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While the United States remains an outlier among OECD countries, a number of 
policy changes across jurisdictions suggest significant convergence in the role of the 
state in financing health care. These changes, coupled with the introduction of a 
universal mandate in the United States, suggest that many of the lessons learned above 
may apply in the United States as well. Greater government involvement will not 
prevent significant innovation in incentives for efficient purchasing and provision. Nor 
will it prevent patients from being able to choose insurer or provider or automatically 
result in longer wait times for treatment. The evidence also suggests, however, that 
further government involvement in the health care sector without price or volume 
controls will not necessarily lead to more use of economic evaluation or to lower 
growth rates in the cost of care, consequences many people associate with a greater role 
for the state.  
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Coverage Australia Canada England France Germany Switzerland United States 
Breadth: 
population (% 
covered in 2011) 
100% covered by 
regionally 
administered 
universal program 
(Medicare) 
100% covered by 
regionally 
administered 
universal program 
(Medicare 
100% covered by 
universal program 
(National Health 
Service, NHS) 
100% covered by 
universal program 
90% covered by 
public program; 
10% covered by 
private insurance 
100% covered by 
universal private 
insurance 
31.8% covered by national 
program for 65+ and some 
disabled (Medicare) or 
low-income (Medicaid); 
53.1% covered by private 
insurance; 16% uninsured 
Scope: benefits Benefit decisions 
made by national 
government and 
informed by HTA 
Benefit decisions 
made by regional 
government in 
conjunction with 
doctors and 
informed by HTA 
Benefit decisions 
made at regional 
level and informed 
by HTA at national 
level 
Benefit decisions 
made at national 
level and informed 
by HTA 
Benefit decisions 
mainly made at 
national level and 
informed by HTA 
Benefit decisions 
made at national 
level and informed 
by HTA 
Benefit decisions made 
nationally (Medicare), 
regionally (Medicaid) and 
by individual insurers 
(private insurance) 
Depth: user fees User fees for 
outpatient services 
including 
prescriptions. No 
cap on user fees. 
No user fees for 
publicly covered 
benefits. No cap on 
user fees. 
 
User fees for 
outpatient 
prescriptions. 
Capped at £104 per 
year for people 
needing a large 
number of 
prescription drugs 
User fees widely 
applied. No cap on 
user fees. 
User fees for 
outpatient 
prescriptions. 
Capped at 2% 
income or 1% 
income for 
chronically ill or 
low income 
User fees widely 
applied. Capped at 
CHF 700 CHF 
after deductible. 
User fees widely applied. 
No cap on user fees. 
VHI role ~50% buy 
coverage for 
private hospital 
costs and non-
covered benefits 
~67% buy 
coverage for non-
covered benefits 
~11% buy for 
private facilities 
~90% buy or 
receive government 
vouchers for cost-
sharing; some non-
covered benefits 
Cost-sharing + 
amenities (~20%); 
Substitute: 10% opt 
out of SHI system 
for private coverage 
only 
Majority buy for 
non-covered 
benefits and 
amenities 
Non-covered Medicare 
benefits 
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Collection        
Revenue sources General tax 
revenue; 
earmarked income 
tax 
Provincial/federal tax 
revenue 
General tax 
revenue (includes 
employment-
related 
contributions) 
Employer/employee 
earmarked income 
and payroll tax; 
general tax revenue, 
earmarked taxes 
Employer/employee 
earmarked payroll 
tax; general tax 
revenue 
Community-rated 
insurance 
premiums; general 
tax revenue 
Medicare: payroll 
tax, premiums, 
federal tax 
revenue; 
Medicaid: federal, 
state tax revenue 
Contributions Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Centrally set; 
dependants 
covered at no extra 
cost 
Centrally set; 
dependants 
covered at no extra 
cost 
Insurers set 
premiums; 
dependants must 
purchase own 
cover; premium 
subsidies set by 
Cantons 
Medicare: 
centrally 
determined 
Pooling        
Nature of 
purchasing agent 
National 
government 
agency 
Non-competing 
regional government 
agencies 
Non-competing 
regional statutory 
bodies 
Non-competing 
regional statutory 
agencies 
Competing non-
governmental non-
profit insurers and 
competing private 
insurers 
Competing private 
insurers 
Competing private 
insurers 
Risk adjustment 
for competing 
insurers 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable For publicly 
financed benefits 
For publicly 
financed benefits 
For publicly 
financed benefits 
Purchasing 
services 
       
Patient choice of 
primary care 
provider 
Yes; gatekeeping 
required 
Yes; gatekeeping 
incentivized in some 
regions 
Yes, within a 
region; 
gatekeeping 
required 
Yes; gatekeeping 
incentivized 
Yes; gatekeeping 
incentivized 
Yes; some plans 
incentivize 
gatekeeping 
Usually; some 
plans incentivize 
gatekeeping 
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Patient choice of 
hospital 
Yes Yes, through GP Yes Yes Yes Yes Usually 
Primary care and 
ambulatory 
specialist provider 
payment 
Private: FFS Private: 
FFS/capitation/mixed 
Private: mix of 
capitation, FFS 
and P4P; salary for 
a minority 
Private: FFS Private: FFS Private: most FFS 
but some 
capitation 
Private: most FFS, 
some capitation 
Hospital payment Public beds (67%): 
global budgets + 
DRGs 
Private: FFS 
Public and private 
non-profit: global 
budgets + DRGS in 
some provinces 
Public: mainly 
DRGs and service 
contracts 
Public and private 
non-profit: mainly 
DRGs and grants 
Public beds (50%), 
private non-profit 
(33%), private for 
profit: global 
budgets + DRGs 
Public varies by 
Canton: global 
budgets, per diem, 
DRGs 
Private non-profit 
(70%), public 
(15%), private for 
profit: per diem + 
DRGs 
P4P Primary care and 
hospitals 
No Primary care and 
hospitals 
Primary care, 
ambulatory 
specialists and 
hospitals 
Primary care No Primary care, 
ambulatory 
specialists and 
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